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Critique of Kant on arithmetiC 
Leslie STEVENSON 1
In the Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant claims two kinds of 
synthetic a priori knowledge – in mathematics, and in our representations of space and time 
as wholes.2 He says that both kinds involve a priori (pure) intuitions; but they raise different 
issues, as he realized in his “prize essay” of 1764 when he first demarcated the methods of 
mathematics and metaphysics. After his “great light” in 1769 he distinguished intuitions, i.e., 
immediate acquaintance with particular objects affecting our senses, from concepts, i.e., general 
rules of classification (and constituents of judgments). The distinction between sensibility and 
understanding seems obvious now, but the notion of a priori intuition is a more obscure and 
controversial matter, as we will see. 
Kant has some persuasive things to say about the primitive basis of arithmetic in our 
activities of counting and calculating. This is obviously where mathematics starts, when children 
learn their first concepts of number, and some people do not get much further. Many Kant-
interpreters recycle his elementary examples of small addition sums (B15) and easy geometrical 
constructions (A716-7/B744-5).3 But there was more to the mathematics of Kant’s time, as 
he well knew,4 and of course the subject has advanced by leaps and bounds since then. I want 
to discuss how well his account of arithmetic holds up in the light of later developments in 
philosophy, logic, and the foundations of mathematics. Geometry is a more natural home 
for Kant’s distinctive claims, and many commentators mention arithmetic only briefly, and 
hurry on to discuss the intuitive evidence and necessity of Euclidean geometry with its obvious 
connection with space, and its supposed support for transcendental idealism.5 This essay will 
deal with arithmetic only, in the hope that a careful examination of arithmetic as candidate for 
synthetic a priori status, and as topic of a priori intuition, may yield philosophical dividends.
78     Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 9, n. 1, p. 77-88, Jan./Jun., 2021
STEVENSON, L. 
In the Prolegomena Kant remarked that whereas geometry is based on the pure intuition 
of space, arithmetic forms its concepts of numbers by the successive addition of units in time 
(4:283), and that suggests a neat division of duties. But though we can count a succession 
of temporal episodes, such as the tolling of a bell or the bars in a piece of music, we can also 
recognize at a glance small numbers of static objects such as people in a room or marks on a 
page; moreover, we can count “things” that are not in space or time, for example the four prime 
numbers between 10 and 20. Counting is a mental procedure that calls on knowledge of an 
ordered set of numerals (at least, the first few of them). Kant emphasized that any process of 
counting takes time (perhaps a long time: if imprisoned, one might record the days by making 
scratches on the wall).
Once one can do some counting, elementary addition becomes possible. But in the 
B-Introduction Kant controversially declared as “incontrovertibly certain” and “very important 
in the sequel” that all mathematical judgments are synthetic.6 He admitted that mathematical 
inferences “proceed in accordance with the principle of contradiction” (B14) and that “equals 
added to or subtracted from equals are analytic propositions” (A164/B204), yet he stoutly 
maintained that the propositions of pure mathematics are synthetic, even simple sums such as 
7+5=12:
The concept of sum of 7 and 5 contains nothing more than the unification of both numbers in a single 
one … The concept of twelve is by no means already thought merely by thinking of that unification 
of both numbers in a single one, and no matter how long I analyze my concept of such a possible sum 
I will not find twelve in it. One must go beyond these concepts, seeking assistance in the intuition 
that corresponds to one of the two, one’s five fingers, say, or … five points, and one after another add 
the units of the five given in the intuition to the concept of seven … The arithmetical proposition is 
therefore always synthetic … (B15, see also A164/B295 and Prolegomena 4:268-9) 
A crude reaction to this is that for numbers greater than ten you will run out of fingers, 
and if you have lost a finger or two in an accident your counting will run into problems even 
earlier. And if you resort to making marks on paper you had better beware of slips of the pen, 
or ink running out: any such reliance on empirical intuition, i.e. perception of the physical 
world, is liable to all the shocks that such stuff is heir to. In olden days people could use an 
abacus, nowadays we have electronic calculators; but all material apparatus is subject to user 
error or malfunction. 
A classic worry arises from the vagueness of Kant’s notion of analyticity, appealing to 
what is “contained” or “thought” in a concept. But neither of those criteria can decide what is 
analytic or synthetic in controversial cases. At B17 he says “the question is not what we should 
think in addition to the given concept, but what we actually think in it, though only obscurely” 
– but that only makes the matter more obscure. Kant offered something clearer later on, in his 
introduction to the Analytic of Principles:
If the judgment is analytic, whether it be negative or affirmative, its truth must always be able to 
be recognized sufficiently in accordance with the principle of contradiction. (A151/B190, see also 
Prolegomena 4:267)
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The test is now whether the negation of the judgment implies a contradiction. That will 
still not decide the question when there is no consensus about what is “contained in” or implied 
by ordinary, non-mathematical concepts, such as gold or marriage. However, there should be 
better prospect of applying the contradiction test in mathematics, where we deal with strict 
definitions. As Kant himself said: 
Mathematical definitions cannot err. For since the concept is first given through the definition, it 
contains just that which the definition would think through it. (A731/B759)
Of course, one can think of, and write in symbols, an addition sum of two large numbers, 
such as 342597 + 68069, without there and then thinking of the answer, the number which is 
their sum.7 But one may be equally foxed by a complex chain of syllogisms or a long formula in 
propositional logic, even if the inference is valid or a truth-table will show that the formula is a 
tautology: and those surely are logical truths, and presumably therefore analytic.8 Not all logical 
truths are obvious, and those that are not can be decided by various technical procedures, which 
Kant would call “constructions”. But is there any tension between analyticity and reliance on 
such constructions?
To apply this to Kant’s example, here is a backwards method to show that 7+5=12 is 
analytic by the contradiction test. Suppose that 7+5 is not equal to 12, then subtract 1 from 
12, and 1 from 5, then from 11 and 4, and so on, and you will quickly reach the contradiction 
that 7 Is not equal to 7.9 You don’t need decimal notation to do this, and you don’t have to 
rely on your fingers, you only need to count up to twelve, then go back five steps, one at a 
time. Our words for numbers are learnt in whatever language our parents speak: we repeat the 
first ten or twenty numerals by rote in the right order, then we use them to count small sets of 
objects or events; later we learn the written numerals up to 9, then we catch on to the use of 
zero in decimal notation, and may come to realize that it provides for indefinite extendibility10. 
One of our earliest lessons is that the word ‘five’ comes after ‘four’ in the series. That is an 
empirical fact about English usage, but ’four plus one is five’ and ‘5-1=4’ surely qualify as true 
by definition. All uses of words or symbols rest on conventions, of course, but that does not 
mean that every sentence or formula is synthetic. Kant recognized that in mathematics we use 
precise definitions about how to use our mathematical words and symbols (see the opening of 
the 1764 prize essay at 2:276, and A726-732/754-760). But that does not make arithmetical 
judgments empirical; we assert them a priori, only on the basis of having learnt the relevant 
conventions, but that applies whenever we say anything about anything.11 
It is tempting to conclude that the ordered list of numerals plus the rule-governed 
procedures for addition, subtraction and multiplication, make arithmetical truths analytic, 
in the sense that their negations imply contradictions. However, subtle questions lurk about 
the nature of logical implication and logical truth in mathematics. Kant’s understanding 
of logic was primitive by our post-Fregean standards, and that was arguably his greatest 
intellectual handicap. He knew only the theory of syllogisms supplemented by disjunction 
and conditionality; he had no notion of the predicate calculus with its relational terms and 
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quantifiers. So, it is understandable why he thought that even simple arithmetical sums called 
on extra-logical resources, and had to be classed as synthetic. 
Many logicians and philosophers have since argued that our powerful modern logic 
shows that arithmetic is (non-trivially) analytic after all (and hence, perhaps, much more of 
mathematics). But Kantian-inspired doubts have been raised about this by Parsons (1983) 
and Friedman (1992).12 Frege and Russell, and others down to the present day, have pursued 
the logicist programme of defining numbers in terms of logic, and deriving all arithmetical 
truths from logical truths.13 But despite a century of immense technical sophistication,14 
nagging questions remain about what exactly qualifies as logic, and hence as analytic. Does 
logic include set theory, or higher-order quantification, and can the existence of an infinity of 
numbers be derived from logic alone? Although mathematical proof aspires to complete logical 
rigour, and surely attains it in arithmetic, there is still room for Kantians to maintain that the 
underlying assumptions that make arithmetic possible are not purely logical truths even by 
modern standards.
Once we can count sets of manageable size, by pronouncing or marking numerals while 
we correlate them with distinguishable objects of attention we are counting,15 we take a new 
step when we understand that there is no end to the series of numbers, that there always is (in 
a remarkably abstract sense of ’existence’) a number greater than any number we have so far 
thought of or symbolized. Our symbols can get ever longer, but they remain necessarily finite; 
yet according to our conception of the integers, every number has a successor, with no repeats, 
so there are infinitely many of them. Whether this is a logical truth depends, as noted already, 
on what we are prepared to describe as logic. Even that little reverse proof that 7+5 = 12 has to 
proceed step by step: 12-5, 11-4, 10-3, 9-2, 8-1, 7; and to be recognized as valid, the procedure 
has to be carried out in time (like the literal steps in walking). Kant had some reason, then, to 
say that though arithmetical truths are not about anything happening in time (their content is 
not temporal) our ability to recognize them depends on our ability to complete iterative mental 
processes that take time.
Does this vindicate Kant’s notion of a priori intuition? In his reply in 1790 to Eberhard’s 
Leibnizian criticisms he offered a more positive account of syntheticity:
the principle of synthetic judgments in general, which follows necessarily from their definition, [is] 
that they are only possible under the condition that an intuition underlies the concept of their subject, 
which, if the judgments are empirical, is empirical, and if they are synthetic judgments a priori, is a 
pure intuition a priori. (1790, 8:241, with Kant’s emphasis) 
Allison has commented that it is the notion of synthetic that “wears the trousers” here, 
since analytic judgments could now be characterized as those whose truth does not depend on 
intuition, so that any reference to an “object” is otiose, whereas synthetic judgments extend 
our knowledge in a “material” sense, asserting the “reality” of the predicate as applying to the 
subject (Allison (2004), pp.89-93). But it is not clear how such talk applies in arithmetic: it 
seems to lead into unanswerable questions of mathematical ontology, perhaps merely verbal 
disputes. Are numbers objects? Do we refer to them? Are arithmetical predicates real? Can 
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arithmetic extend our knowledge materially? I hardly know how to address these questions, but 
I do want to ask whether arithmetic involves a priori intuition. 
Kant’s late gloss on syntheticity, as quoted above, appeals to his bifurcated notion of 
intuition. If we were to ignore his invocation of a priori intuition, we would have only the usual 
distinction between analytic truths and synthetic facts knowable by perception, as in Hume 
and logical positivism. Kant doggedly maintained his third realm of the synthetic a priori as 
the basis of his critical philosophy; but the above account threatens to tie our understanding 
of synthetic judgment to the notion of a priori intuition. Is he making arithmetic analytic by 
the contradiction test of 1781, but synthetic by its dependence on a priori intuition in 1790? 
That would be very confusing, we had better take him at his word in the latter passage that 
he is not there defining syntheticity, only pointing out what his philosophical views commit 
him to saying about it. That puts the pressure on his notion of a priori intuition: but that 
is a paradoxical notion, for there is a prima facie tension between being a quasi-perceptual 
experience and being prior to experience. My discussion here is restricted to its relevance to 
arithmetic. 
It is clear that doing arithmetic makes mental demands on us, at various levels. Animals 
and infants cannot count. Children learn the first few number words, and use them to 
count small sets of objects; later they begin to apply the rules for addition, subtraction and 
multiplication (division can present more of a challenge). At any stage some will encounter 
“learning difficulties”, and many adults remain mathematically challenged.16 Many of us can 
do a little computation “in our heads”, but at some point we need to do our sums on paper. A 
few of us study mathematics, and a select few become mathematicians. 
An important part of Kant’s point is that in mathematics we find it much more efficient, 
and in a sense “intuitive”, to use visible symbols rather than words.17 Arithmetical propositions 
can in principle be expressed in words, if one is prepared to use enough of them, but it is much 
more convenient to use systems of symbols. The Romans had an unwieldy notation in which 4 
was represented, not by ‘IIII’, but by ‘IV’. The Arabs had the brilliant idea of a symbol for zero, 
which made possible the decimal system that is indefinitely extendible. 
To illustrate the utility of symbolic notation in mathematics, I have set out in an 
appendix the elegant little proof that there is no rational square root of two, firstly in algebraic 
symbols, then in words, then in logical notation. The propositions expressed do not depend 
on the language used (English or Japanese) or the choice of symbols (decimal or binary). The 
verbal and logical versions can be formulated for this short argument, at least, but the symbols 
such as (a/b)2 = 2 make it much easier to follow. The words and logic are cumbersome and 
“unintuitive” in their own way, even in this easy case, so it is obvious why most mathematical 
reasoning is conducted in whatever symbolism is found convenient for the job in hand. Heavy-
duty logical apparatus can in principle be wheeled in to check whether a putative proof is 
completely watertight, testing it line by line for conformity to recognized rules of inference.18 
But it is a crucial point that there are no mechanically-applicable rules for constructing proofs, 
and that recently-vindicated thought provides another partial vindication of Kant’s notion of 
a priori intuition. 
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Arithmetic may be narrowly defined as “sums,” i.e. addition, subtraction multiplication 
and division, involving only the integers. These procedures can be mechanized, for the relevant 
questions are computable in the technical logical sense (though computers have physical limits 
whereas numbers do not). Many new mathematical concepts have been developed: we now 
recognize negative integers, rational numbers, real numbers, and complex numbers (counting 
on your fingers won’t take you very far with these). It is a merely verbal question whether 
all that can be called “arithmetic,” but Kant knew that there is more to number theory than 
primary school sums. We can define further arithmetical concepts such as prime number, 
perfect number, and square root, and in terms of them we can formulate some interesting 
general propositions. Some can be readily proved, e.g., that there is no greatest prime number; 
others remain unsolved, e.g., the Goldbach conjecture that every even number is the sum 
of two primes; and some, though easy to understand, have been proved only by appeal to 
recently-developed esoteric regions of mathematics, e.g., Fermat’s Last Theorem. 
Kant declared at A713/B741 that mathematics uses “construction of concepts” rather 
than “rational cognition from concepts” as in philosophy,19 and that seems to be his main 
reason for holding that mathematical judgments are synthetic a priori. But our breif survey of 
mathematical practice shows that there is more than one kind of construction:
1. There is the elementary stage of counting small sets of objects or events.
2. There is the stage of doing sums according to the standard rules, using symbols on 
paper (or these days, electronic calculators). These procedures are mechanical, and 
are guaranteed to produce the right answer if applied correctly. 
3. Realizing that the numbers go on forever, beyond all physically constructible 
notations, and hence the validity of proof by mathematical induction. 
4. Proving general conjectures about numbers. But because there are no mechanical 
methods for constructing such proofs; a higher degree of insight is required to 
understand the validity of the inferential steps, let alone to construct a proof one 
hasn’t seen before.
5. More advanced mathematics uses a panoply of special symbols for complicated new 
concepts, and employs some esoteric methods of proof which only professionals 
working in the relevant area may understand. Mathematicians form new concepts, 
and at the highest degree of creativity they construct new kinds of proof. A 
mathematician can work for years to construct a proof before realizing, sometimes 
in a flash of “intuition”, that a certain method will work.20 
At A717/B745 Kant distinguished “symbolic” construction in arithmetic from 
“ostensive” construction in geometry;21 and I am pointing out that there are several more kinds 
of construction within arithmetic and number theory.
Do these all involve “a priori (or pure) intuition?” The phrase is Kant’s, but as far as I 
know he did not distinguish these different levels of its application.22 Since Frege’s refutation 
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(1884/1950) of Mill’s implausibly radical empiricism about arithmetic, everyone agrees that 
the arithmetical propositions are a priori, i.e., no possible experience can count against them. 
A question arises, however, about Kant’s extension of his notion of “intuition” from sense-
perception of the material world to the recognition of mathematical truths. He can find some 
ordinary-language support from the fact that we can talk of “seeing” that 7+5 = 12, and at a 
more demanding level, of a mathematician “perceiving” that a certain method of proof will 
succeed. But what is in common between material and mathematical perception? In both there 
is recognition of objective truths that hold independently of anyone’s mental states; and such 
judgments are not purely passive, not reflex reactions or mere associations of ideas, they involve 
what Kant calls “spontaneity” in applying concepts, whether empirical or mathematical. And 
judgments are often the result of activity and effort, to scrutinize a material state of affairs more 
closely, or to perform a computation or construct a proof. If mathematics can be said to involve 
some sort of intuition, it certainly involves concepts.
But there remains an obvious difference between sensory and mathematical perception, 
for the former involves, by definition, the causal impact of the external world on our sense-
organs. To be sure, in doing arithmetic we may see symbols on the page or blackboard, we hear 
what our teachers say, and the blind can read braille by touch; but mathematical perception 
is more than seeing marks (as a chimpanzee might), it means “seeing that” certain necessary 
connections hold, judging the relevant propositions to be true a priori; and such seeing that 
can occur without any sensory perception at the time, in moments of mathematical insight, 
whether elementary or virtuosic. Kant acknowledged the causal element in intuition when he 
wrote: 
[intuition] takes place only insofar as the object is given to us; but this in turn [at least for us humans 
– phrase added in B] is possible only if it affects the mind in a certain way. … Objects are therefore 
given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone affords us intuitions. (A19/B33)
It comes along with our nature that intuition can never be other than sensible, i.e., that it contains 
only the way in which we are affected by objects. (A51/B75)
Taken out of context, these sentences restrict “intuition” (Anschauung) to sense-
perception, and would rule out its application to mathematical perception. But Kant goes on 
to talk of pure or a priori intuition which does not involve sensation, in which “the pure form 
of sensible intuitions in general is to be encountered in the mind a priori” (A20/B34). Yet at 
the beginning of the chapter on Phenomena and Noumena he wrote:
Now the object cannot be given to a concept otherwise than in intuition, and even if a pure intuition 
is possible a priori prior to the object, then even this can acquire its object, thus its objective validity, 
only through empirical intuition [my emphasis], of which it is the mere form. … the concept of 
magnitude seeks its standing and sense in number, but this seeks this in turn in the fingers, in the 
beads of an abacus, or in strokes or points that are placed before our eyes. (A239/240/B298-9)
Kant is obviously right that this is where arithmetic starts, in the practice of counting, 
which involves empirical intuition plus a kind of conceptualization that is not available to 
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animals (so far as we know). But it is equally obvious that the theory of numbers does not end 
there. Some faithful Kantians do not seem to take the point: Lucy Allais, for example, writes:
It is crucial to Kant’s account that a construction in intuition is not a theoretical (conceptual) 
construction: it essentially involves an object that is presented (exhibited, manifestly displayed). 
… Kant thinks that mathematical truth does not go beyond what can possibly be constructed in 
intuition, and this means that it is limited to something that can be manifested to consciousness ... 
Allais (2015, p. 203)
But what about the mathematical truth that there are infinitely many whole numbers – 
or the greater infinity of the real numbers, or the infinity of different infinities that have since 
been conceptualized? These are surely “theoretical (conceptual) constructions”, but where is 
the “object” that is presented or “constructed in intuition”? To be sure, mathematicians use 
perceptible symbols to express these truths, but it is impossible to “construct” or “exhibit” 
an infinite set of symbols. We believe that for any given number there are infinitely many 
more, and we can “see” why that has to be true. But Kant’s insistence on “pure intuition” in 
mathematics does not seem to add anything to the uncontroversial observation that we make 
certain conceptual definitions and constructions, and recognize the necessity of mathematical 
inferences and truths.
Kant asserted that the existence of synthetic a priori truths has momentous philosophical 
implications.  In his “Transcendental exposition of the concept of space” (B40-1) he appealed 
to the (alleged) synthetic a priority of geometry to argue that geometrical intuition “has its 
seat merely in the subject”. But in the supposedly parallel “Transcendental exposition of the 
concept of time” (B48-9) he does not explicitly appeal to a priori intuition in arithmetic, nor 
does he argue there that time is merely in the subject. In the First Introduction to the Critique 
of Judgment he admitted that “the universal theory of time, unlike the pure theory of space 
(geometry) does not provide us with enough material for a whole science” (10:237). The fact 
that we begin arithmetic by counting is hardly enough to prove the remarkable metaphysical 
claim that time “is nothing except the form of our inner intuition” (A37/B54), which can exist 
only “in us” (A42/B60). 
I have not considered the cases of geometry or metaphysics in this essay, but as far as 
arithmetic is concerned, I have argued that the Kantian assertion that it is synthetic now rests 
on uncertainty about what we should count as logic. Unclarity about that suggests that we 
should not rest much philosophical weight on the claim that arithmetic is synthetic. I have 
also argued that Kant’s conception of a priori intuition in arithmetic is more controversial than 
the notion of mathematical perception. Whatever the virtues (or vices) of a priori intuition in 
the rest of his philosophy, I do not think it casts much light on our concepts and practices in 
dealing with numbers.
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aPPenDiX: Proving that there is no rational square root of two
The argument in symbols
Suppose there were numbers a and b, with no common divisor, such that (a/b)2 = 2
If so, a2 = 2b2, hence 2 must divide a, so for some number c, a= 2c
Hence 4c2 = 2b2, so 2c2 = b2, hence 2 must divide b
Then a and b would have a common divisor, namely 2
But that contradicts the original supposition, which is therefore false.
The argument in words
Suppose there were two numbers with no common divisor, such that the square of the ratio of 
the first number to the second number is two
If so, the square of the first number is equal to twice the square of the second number,
Hence two divides the first number, so it must be twice some third number
Hence four times the square of that third number equals the square of the second number
Hence two divides the second number
Then the first and second numbers would have a common divisor, namely two
That contradicts the original supposition, which is therefore false.
The argument formalized in logic 
(a/b)2 = 2 & --(Ex)(Ey)(Ez)(a = xy & b = xz)    hypothesis
a2 = 2b2        from 1
(Ex)(a = 2x)       from 2
4c2 = 2b2        from 2 and 3
(Ex)(b = 2c)       from 4
(Ex)(Ey)(Ez)(a = xy & b = xz)     from 3 and 5
(Ex)(Ey)(Ez)(a = xy & b = xz) & - (Ex)(Ey)(Ez)(a = xy & b = xz)  from 1 and 6
-- [(a/b)2 = 2 & --(Ex)(Ey)(Ez)(a = xy & b = xz)]    reductio ad absurdum, 1
        and 7
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abstraCt: Arithmetical truths are a priori, but our understanding of them starts with the practical experience of counting. Whether 
arithmetic is analytic – or synthetic as Kant maintained – turns out to depend on what view we take about the precise scope of logic. 
A survey of mathematical theorizing about various kinds of numbers shows that there is more than one kind of “construction” or 
“intuition” involved. Kant’s conception of a priori intuition, as applied to arithmetic, seems to be just mathematical perception.
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Categories, which I will not consider here.
3 A recent faithful interpreter is Shabel (2006).
4 In 1763 Kant remarked on the “numberless beauties” of Euclidean geometry, citing some non-trivial theorems (2:93-5) – 
but contrary to his own emphasis on constructions, he there chose to express those proofs in cumbersome words rather than 
in diagrams. At A169-170/B211-2 his mention of “flowing magnitudes” (fliessende Grössen) suggests some acquaintance with 
Newton’s fluxional calculus, see Friedman (1992) pp.74-7. But how well he understood its details (or Leibniz’s version) is another 
matter.
5 For example, Allais (2015) provides an impressive in-depth discussion of central themes in Kant’s theoretical philosophy, but 
arithmetic and time do not appear in the index – perhaps because they cannot bear the greater weight that Kant puts on geometry 
and space.
6 As he already asserted in in his prize essay of 1764. 
7 There are people (once called “idiots savants”) who can do such calculations in their head instantaneously, but even they must 
have their limits when numbers run into trillions.
8 Bennett said that putative synthetic a priori judgments can turn out to concern “certain very complex and unobvious conceptual 
facts” (1966, p.14).  Potter has made a similar point in more detail (2000, p.39).
9 From what Kant said at A164/B204 it surely follows that subtraction of equals from both sides of an inequality must preserve 
inequality.
10 Unlike that cumbersome Roman numerals, which soon run out of letters.
11 For a robust in-depth defence of the analytic-synthetic distinction against Quine’s classic attack see Hanna (2015, Chapter 4). 
He also defends a Kantian notion of the synthetic a priori.
12 I can hardly emulate the depth and length of these modern classics, but I hope to cast a little more light from a different angle.
13 See Potter (2000), Chapters 2, 4 and 5 for a critical account.
14 For a very detailed review see Tennant (2017).
15 Sutherland (2017) has presented a very comprehensive analysis of the cardinal and ordinal aspects of Kant’s conception of 
number.
16 The psychologist Susan Carey presents evidence that a primitive sensitivity to number is part of what she calls “core cognition,” 
innately emerging in early infancy (2011, Chapter 4). She goes on to argue that the notions of the natural numbers and of rational 
numbers are human constructions that go beyond core cognition, by a process of conceptual development that (following Quine) 
she calls “bootstrapping” (2011, Chapters 8 and 9).
17 Presumably the blind can do some arithmetic, but can Braille enable a blind person to understand a mathematical proof 
by feeling the layout of symbols on a page, having them “exhibited” to touch instead of sight? There are interesting empirical 
questions here.
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STEVENSON, L. 
18 I doubt that most referees for papers submitted to mathematical journals actually resort to symbolic logic in their evaluations. 
It would probably be too cumbersome, and hence liable to at least as much error in application as informal “intuitive” logic. And 
there can be controversy over certain patterns of inference: for example, the rejection by mathematical intuitionists (in another 
sense of that controversial word!) of certain forms of proof in classical mathematics. 
19 See also the Vienna Logic at 797-8 and 893, the Dohna-Wundlachen Logic at 697, and the Jasche Logic at 23, all in Kant 
(1992).
20 A famous recent example is Andrew Wiles’s experience, dated as precisely as the morning of 19 September 1994, when he 
suddenly realized how to overcome the flaw in his first attempt at proving Fermat’s last theorem. Of course, the flash of insight or 
intuition has to be verified by the detailed work of constructing and writing the proof in a public form that other mathematicians 
can evaluate.
21 See Friedman (1992), p.108.
22 Parsons (1983) p.141, distinguished the intuition involved in recognizing that 2+2=4 from that involved in proving by 
mathematical induction that something holds for all numbers.
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